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Article 19(1) TEU is emerging as the lynchpin of the EU’s legal order.  It sets down
the essential guarantees and organization of the EU judiciary, imposes a duty on
Member States to afford effective legal protection of individual rights under EU
law, and, over the past two years, it has been used to push back against attacks
on judicial independence and other forms of democratic backsliding in Poland as
well as Hungary.  For good reason, therefore, the BVerfG’s PSPP judgment has
raised concerns beyond the ambit of central bankers and finance ministers, among
EU constitutional lawyers more generally speaking.  In the PSPP judgment, the
BVerfG says that not only the ECB acted ultra vires, but so too the CJEU—the
CJEU failed to act in accordance with law and carry out its duty to “ensure that in
the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed” under Article
19(1) (163).  One can only imagine the use that will make of this assertion in the
multiple EU legal proceedings that have been brought against Hungary and Poland
for democratic backsliding and, more broadly, in any proceeding before the CJEU
seeking to enforce compliance with EU law.  
The rest of this post contributes to the growing body of legal writing that analyzes
the BVerfG’s 19 (1) conclusion and shows that it is itself problematic as a matter of
law.  My central point is that the CJEU’s  proportionality analysis that induced the 
BVerfG’s ultra vires finding might not satisfy the standards of German constitutional
law—but it does hold up under the formal text and jurisprudence of EU constitutional
law.  In the immediate predecessor to this judgment, the German litigation on the
ECB’s OMT Programme, Justice Lübbe-Wolff issued a forceful dissent and she
issued the following warning for future cases (25): 
That some few independent German judges – invoking the German
interpretation of the principle of democracy, the limits of admissible
competences of the ECB following from this interpretation, and our reading
of Art. 123 et seq. TFEU – make a decision with incalculable consequences
for the operating currency of the euro zone and the national economies
depending on it appears as an anomaly of questionable democratic
character [emphasis added].
That, I argue, is precisely what has occurred here, with important implications for the
lawfulness of the CJEU and the legitimacy of the BVerfG’s PSPP judgment.
BVerfG’s Critique of the CJEU
In the view of the BVerfG, the problem with the CJEU’s proportionality analysis is
the failure to consider adequately the PSPP’s impact on economic policy (133).
  This is defined in the narrow, fiscal sense—the balance sheets of countries and
commercial banks—and in the broader, economic and social sense—rates of return
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and risk-taking in pension plans, asset bubbles, and so on (139, 171, 172, 173.) 
  The proportionality test requires that government action be (1) suitable and (2)
necessary to accomplish the objectives pursued, and that it (3) not disproportionately
burden the right or interest at stake (proportionality in the strict sense).  Although the
BVerfG is generally critical, it finds greatest fault with the third, strict-sense prong
of the test—to simplify somewhat, the charge is that the CJEU blindly accepted the
ECB’s monetary policy rationale, did not independently scrutinize the bond-buying
program’s economic policy effects, and failed to determine whether the effect (and
burden) on economic policy was outweighed by the benefits accomplished by the
bond-buying program in terms of protecting against deflation (133,  138, 168). 
To engage with this critique, it is necessary to take a step back and ask a more basic
question—why should a proportionality assessment of an instrument of monetary
policy, which no one doubts is at least in part designed to increase money supply
and combat deflation, examine that instrument’s effect on economic policy?  There
are two different answers—one under EU law, the other under German law.  
German Law
First, German law.  Although it is a complex and evolving area of jurisprudence,
the bottom line is that under German law, state control over fiscal and economic
policy has been attached to the individual, constitutional “right to democratic self-
determination.”  EU monetary policy that affects fiscal policy is conceived as
burdening that right of democratic self-determination.  Therefore, such measures
must satisfy a rigorous, three-step proportionality test familiar to both EU and
German lawyers from other areas, such as those involving fundamental rights like
privacy and the right to family.  
The contours of this German right have been developed by the BVerfG in a line
of cases that accelerated after the Lisbon judgment and that now counts the
decisions on the EFSF, the ESM, the OMT, and the PSPP.  In this jurisprudence,
the Stability and Growth Pact element of the Maastricht Treaty’s monetary union
(in German legal writing is called a “stability union,”  what some more bluntly call
“Austerity Union”) has been essentialized as the non-negotiable condition under
which Germany ratified the Maastricht Treaty.  Any departure involving Germany’s
budgetary powers, i.e. assumption of debt liability or transfer of resources, requires
a vote in the Parliament (ESM judgment,110, 118) and, following the logic of the
Lisbon judgment’s “identity lock,” this is a requirement that cannot be given away by
Parliament (EFSF judgment, 125) Below I call this the “right to stability” but it should
be kept in mind that departures can be authorized based on a parliamentary vote,
thereby satisfying the underpinning right to democratic self-determination.
 In tandem with this essentialization of EU fiscal stability, the BVerfG has
dramatically expanded the ability of individuals to vindicate the right through
constitutional complaints.  Like most European systems of public law, Germany
distinguishes between what can be called “subjective rights” on the one hand,
and “objective interests,” on the other—the jurisdiction and remedies of courts are
reserved for important forms of individualized harm (subjective rights), while the
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vindication of objective interests is left to a large degree to the political process.  The
“right to democratic self-determination” used to belong to the objective category,
but the BVerfG has made it progressively easier to bring constitutional complaints
against EU acts (by attacking the associated positive acts or failures to act of
German bodies) based on this right.  It is precisely this subjectivization of the right to
democratic self-determination, combined with the distinctive, budgetary definition of
democracy, that triggered the passage from Justice Lübbe-Wolff’s dissenting opinion
in the OMT case—her concern, together with that of her fellow dissenter in the case
(Justice Michael Gerhardt), and a large segment of the German legal community,
is that it has become too easy to mobilize the BVerfG (and the view of a handful of
judges on economic policy) to engage in what are in essence, political questions, not
legal questions.   
How then does the German right to stability figure in the BVferG’s PSPP
proportionality analysis?  First, the Court requires that there be a hard line drawn
between monetary policy and economic policy so that the impact of the bond-buying
program on economic policy, i.e. the burden on the German right to stability, can
be assessed (127).   There is an implicit on-off switch in the PSPP judgment—
exclusive competence for monetary policy, virtually no competence for economic
policy.  Although from the perspective of German law this might be understandable,
from the perspective of EU law and the Treaty’s system of competences it is far from
evident that such a hard line can be drawn.  That is why the BVerfG  itself waivers
in how it characterizes EU power over economic policy—from something that “in
principle remains a competence of the Member States” (120) to “limited conferral
upon the EU of the competence to coordinate general economic policies, with the
Member States retaining the competence for economic policy at large” (127) to the
assertion that, even though it might not be possible to say exactly how, economic
policy must be different from monetary policy since “the Union only has an exclusive
competence for monetary policy [but not for the matters of economic policy].” (142).
The fact is that, as even non-lawyers can tell you, in the European south, the EU
does has extensive power over economic policy–although it is generally speaking
economic policy of the austerity variety, which has been applied through the
European Semester and which has legal and political bite mostly in debtor Member
States.  When the BVerfG says that ECB monetary policy should not have effects
on economic policy, it doesn’t have in mind the austerity variety of economic policy,
but it is hard to see how a general competence analysis at the EU level can draw a
distinction between the two. 
Second, the BVerfG requires that the proportionality test include a full-fledged, “strict
sense” third step.  In the proportionality principle, regardless of whether German
or EU law is in play, a thorough analysis on the third step is generally reserved for
important rights or interests that could potentially outweigh what has already been
established to be a legitimate and essential public policy measure. Under EU law
it is not immediately apparent what that important right or interest would be.  But it
is under German law—the right to stability. According to the BVerfG, on the third
step, the economic policy effects, i.e. the burden on the German right to stability,
must be fully assessed (139).  The assessment of the economic policy burden
should be broad-ranging—not just the impact on the debt burden and fiscal liability
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of governments, but also more generally on social and economic policy, because
that is what the Lisbon judgment says is an essential component of the Bundestag’s
budgetary power.  And this economic policy burden must be balanced against the
monetary policy benefits of combating deflation.  
Third, the BVerfG calls for ”full judicial review” of the impact of the ECB’s bond-
buying program on economic policy (142).  This standard is required because it
is “imperative that the mandate of the ECSB be subject to strict limitations given
that the ECB and the national central banks are independent institutions . . .
which means that they operate on the basis of a diminished level of democratic
legitimation.” (143) Again, from the perspective of EU law, it is not self-evident
that the ECB should be subject to stringent standards  of judicial review, since
  it can be characterized as a both a constitutional body (since it is created by
the primary law of the EU Treaties) and a technical or administrative body (since
its legitimacy derives in large part from the fact that it possesses the economic
expertise necessary for monetary policy).   However, stricter judicial review of the
independent ECB does follow a certain doctrinal logic under the German right
to stability. In German constitutional law, delegations of power to administrative
bodies are problematic for the reason, familiar to most democratic systems of public
law, that elected representatives should make important policy decisions.  This
is handled by requiring a certain amount of specificity in delegating legislation,
in particular when individual rights are burdened (Wesentlichkeitstheorie), and
through judicial review based on that legislation.  Before there was the ECB,
there was the Bundesbank, and the German central bank’s independence and
policy powers were recognized as an anomaly in this general theory of democratic
legitimation. However, since there were generally no individual rights burdened by
the Bundesbank’s policymaking (the effect on property from potentially inflationary
policies was considered too remote), it mostly escaped constitutional review. 
Now that there is the right to stability, the ECB does not enjoy the same latitude of
action and the determination of the proportionality of its bond-buying program is
to be subjected to “full judicial review”—but again, as a matter of German, not EU,
constitutional law. 
EU Law
I now turn to EU law, and the doctrinal place for considering the economic policy
effects of an instrument of monetary policy.  Typically under EU law, competence
and proportionality are separate grounds for challenging the validity of an EU
act. This doctrinal scheme is a product of the longstanding framework for judicial
review of the validity of EU acts contained in Article 263 TFEU, as well as the
somewhat more recent principle of conferral and proportionality, first recognized
by the Maastricht Treaty (Article 3b EC Treaty) and since elaborated in the Lisbon
Treaty (Article 5 TEU).  In this doctrinal scheme, economic policy effects enter not
under competence analysis, but proportionality. 
Under EU law, the issue of competence is address by examining whether the Treaty
provision offered as the legal basis for the act is the proper legal basis.  Most often,
the litigant challenges the act on the grounds that an alternative Treaty provision and
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policy objective was applicable—generally a Treaty provision that requires unanimity
voting in the Council and therefore one that would stymie action or a Treaty provision
that bars the type of act adopted.  Very often such litigation involves internal market
acts, since the mandate for internal market harmonization is quite broad and involves
qualified majority voting in the Council, unlike Treaty provisions in other policy
areas that can specifically bar certain types of measures and that can impose
significant procedural hurdles to adopting EU acts. The CJEU examines whether
the EU’s asserted legal basis is supported by the reasons listed in act’s preamble,
by the content of the act, by the plausibility (or implausibility) of the connection
between objectives and content, and, sometimes, by additional material produced
in the litigation. C-84/94, 25;  C-217/04, 42; C-317/04, 67-69;  C-270/12, 113; 
C-358/14, 31-70.  It generally does not examine the plausibility of the alternative
policy objective and Treaty provision, even in those cases where there is a claim that
the EU institution’s choice of legal basis was designed to circumvent a prohibition on
action contained in another Treaty provision. C-76/98, 79, 85. When examining the
EU’s asserted legal basis, there is no deference, since assessing whether there is a
mandate for action is a pure legal question of interpretation of the Treaty.   
This competence (legal basis) analysis may be followed by a proportionality analysis.
  The EU test mirrors the German proportionality test described earlier.  The
CJEU sometimes follows a two-part scheme (appropriate and necessary), but
other times also includes a third step involving balancing and the requirement
that “disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.”
C-331/88, 13. When applying this proportionality test to assess the validity of EU
acts, the CJEU generally employs the deferential “manifest error” standard of review,
particularly when the EU act is taken directly pursuant to powers conferred in the
primary law of the TFEU.  
Although couched in somewhat different terms because it responds to the BverfG’s
preliminary reference, the CJEU’s judgment in the PSPP litigation follows this
classic sequence of first examining the legal basis of the PSPP (46-70) and then
analyzing its proportionality (71-100).  The CJEU examines the monetary policy
legal basis offered by the ECB for the PSPP. Based on the enumeration of exclusive
competences in Article 3 TFEU and the text contained in the specific provisions of
the TFEU’s  Title on Economic and Monetary Policy, the CJEU concludes that (51):
the primary objective of the Union’s monetary policy is to maintain price
stability.  The same provisions further stipulate that, without prejudice to
that objective, the ECSB is to support the general economic policies in the
Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of tis objects, as laid
down in Article 3 TEU.
There is no categorical separation of monetary and economic policy (as the BVerfG
says there should be) and no bar on ECB measures aimed at price stability also
impacting economic policy (60) —but that is because the Treaty text does not
contain such a bar, with the exception of Article 123 TFEU, which the CJEU takes up
in a separate portion of the judgment.  The CJEU then examines the PSPP and finds
that the aims and substance of the program come within the scope of these legal
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powers.  On this competence (legal basis) step of the analysis, there is no deference
to the ECB.
The CJEU then takes up the proportionality issue and analyzes the appropriateness
(71-78) and necessity (79-92) of the measure, as well as the potential
disproportionate advantages (93-99).  In the interest of space, I will jump straight
to the issue of disproportionate disadvantages, since that is the part of judgment
that elicited the strongest objections from the BVerfG.   On disproportionate
disadvantages:   The CJEU examines the PSPP rules to limit the liability of 
Member States for defaults on the debt issued by other Member States and finds
that exposure was adequately limited (93-99).  This last step of proportionality,
in particular, did not satisfy the BVerfG.  Yet it is fully in line with how the CJEU
balances countervailing economic interests in prior cases, the closest analogue
being cases where a Member State offer the market rights of economic actors as
what is disadvantaged by the EU act.  Further, as a matter of EU legal logic, it is
difficult to make a case for treating these facts different—since the right to stability
advanced in the German litigation does not figure in the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights or anywhere else in EU primary law.  
The last thing to note about the CJEU’s proportionality analysis is that it applies the
familiar “manifest error of assessment” standard.  The rationale for this standard
is linked to the technical expertise of monetary institutions (24).  This discretion
afforded to European central banks is completely in line with other litigation that
has challenged ECB acts in the CJEU.  (C-62/14, 68; T-79/13, 68) It is also in line
with EU proportionality review of EU acts in a variety of other policy areas.  Take
one—environmental law.  There, this is the standard of review is applied to the
(independent) Commission (T-614/13, 63) and to the Council (C-86/03, 88). Again,
the manifest error standard does not live up to the BVerfG’s call for more rigorous
review of the independent ECB. But again, under EU law, it is hard to discern any
principled  ground for singling out the ECB for special, stricter judicial review as
compared to other EU institutions—only under German law.   
Law, Politics, and the Legitimacy of the CJEU and
BVerfG
Let me conclude by returning to Article 19 TEU.  Based on this discussion of the
EU legal standards that apply to the CJEU, it is evident that the CJEU abided by
the Treaty text and jurisprudence that govern the assessment of the validity of EU
acts.  Indeed, had the CJEU required the ECB to provide special justification for
the PSPP, it might very well have transgressed those standards. The claim that the
CJEU judgment was ultra vires rests entirely on the German right to stability under
German constitutional law.  But that leaves us with another question—if the CJEU
cannot be accused of acting outside of the law and illegitimately taking sides in what
is a deeply divided political debate, what about the BVerfG?  In finding the CJEU
judgment and the ECB PSPP ultra vires, and developing, over the past 10 years,
the doctrinal edifice necessary to do so, did the BVerfG act outside the law?  Has
it illegitimately taken sides in the hotly contested German and European politics of
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Economic and Monetary Union and the viability of the Eurozone and the European
project?  That is certainly something that should and will be debated in the months
and years to come.  
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